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Cet article fait appel au travail de recherche participative et de développement
communautaire que l’auteur a réalisé pendant une période de quatre ans (2001-2005)
en tant que membre d’une équipe de renforcement des capacités créée pour aider à
la relocalisation des Innus Mushuau de Davis Inlet, au Labrador, à la nouvelle
localité de Natuashish en 2002-2003. Il s’intéresse particulièrement aux défis qu’a dû
relever la Natuashish Housing Authority, qui était chargée de mettre en œuvre les
politiques relatives aux nouveaux logements. L’article se termine par une évaluation
de l’impact de la relocalisation de la communauté des Innus Mushuau et les leçons
tirées de l’expérience.
This paper draws upon the author’s participatory research and community
development work conducted over a four-year period (2001-2005) as a member of a
capacity-building team established to support the relocation of the Mushuau Innu of
Labrador from Davis Inlet to the new community of Natuashish in 2002-2003.
Particular attention is devoted to the challenges faced by the Natuashish Housing
Authority, which was assigned the task of implementing policies with respect to the
new housing. The paper concludes with an assessment of the impact of the relocation
on the Mushuau Innu community and the lessons learned from the experience.
WHEN THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (CBC) televised
images of Innu youth sniffing gasoline in Davis Inlet in the winter of 1993, Canadians
were embarrassed and outraged. The CBC reports caught the attention of international
journalists who further raised the profile of this small Labrador community. As a
result of media investigations, the governments of Newfoundland and Labrador and
Canada came under considerable pressure to take seriously the Innu demands for help
which, a year earlier, had reached a new intensity when a house fire in Davis Inlet
resulted in the deaths of six children. In response to this tragedy, the distraught but
mobilized Innu community held a People’s Inquiry to look at the root causes of the
house fire. Relocation to a new place on the mainland of Labrador was identified
during the inquiry as one of the strategies toward healing and renewal. In 1993, the
community endorsed, through a referendum, a proposal by the Mushuau Innu Band
Council for relocation.
A new community was constructed at Sango Bay. Known locally as “Natuashish”,
Ausra Burns, “Moving and Moving Forward: Mushuau Innu Relocation from Davis
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it is located  approximately 295 km north of Happy Valley/Goose Bay and 15 km west
of Davis Inlet on the mainland coast of Labrador. The first phase of the construction
of the new community was conducted over a six-year period, from 1997 to 2003, and
included the design and building of an entirely new town site and all supporting
infrastructure such as roads, an airstrip and a wharf for the approximately 700 people
in the community. Despite construction delays, the first group of residents – 30
families out of 150 families – moved from Davis Inlet to Natuashish in December
2002 and the move was completed over the next 12 months. Seventy homes were
completed by the time of the first move and 133 homes in total were constructed by
the end of 2003.
The Mushuau Innu relocation became one of the most expensive and infamous
relocations of an Aboriginal community in Canadian history. Costs rose from an
estimated $82 million in 1996 to over $152 million at the time of the move in
December 2002 (INAC, 2004). While many believe that the increased expenditure
was necessary for the success of the project, the move has far from completely solved
the community’s problems. The specific circumstances are unique, but the serious
social and economic challenges experienced by the Mushuau Innu are common in
many northern communities and Canadian Aboriginal communities in particular.
Complex barriers to increasing or regaining quality of life in these communities run
along political, cultural, policy and economic lines and have important physical and
environmental dimensions as well. In the case of the Mushuau Innu, for example, the
federal government’s imposed governance system requiring election of a single chief
and council does not reflect the traditional Innu family-based hierarchy. The new
political processes erode solidarity as the community struggles for fair treatment.
More generally, many of the root causes of physical health deterioration and
communal problems can be traced to the loss of cultural continuity in daily life. For
the Mushuau Innu this continuity was disrupted when their traditionally nomadic life
was forcibly changed to a settled existence in increasingly crowded and poorly
serviced communities. Lack of employment and income options as well as
government-imposed policies – including those related to education and social
assistance – did not allow the Innu to spend significant time hunting or foraging in
their traditional territories. In addition, these traditional Innu territories are being used
for military and resource-extraction purposes. While the remote northern location
defined the life of the Mushuau Innu for centuries, this geographic and environmental
setting in modern times becomes problematic, especially with regard to the adequate
and timely provision of goods, materials and services.
This article is about what was learned – and what is still being learned – from the
Mushuau Innu relocation experience up to 2005. It assesses, in particular, the
establishment, performance and capacity-building efforts of the Natuashish Housing
Authority (NHA), an organization charged with planning, delivering and managing
the Mushuau Innu housing. The analysis is based on findings from four years (2001-
2005) of participatory research and community-development work in Davis Inlet and
Natuashish conducted as a member of a multi-stakeholder support team established to
assist the relocation effort. The article begins with a brief discussion of Aboriginal
community relocations in Canada and the experience of the Mushuau Innu to the time
of this most recent relocation. The subsequent section describes the approaches to
research and information gathering undertaken in Davis Inlet and later in Natuashish.
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The ensuing discussion follows the chronological sequence of events surrounding the
community’s move. It starts with the planning of the relocation, explores the
community’s reactions to the new homes and reflects on the actual move. Particular
attention is given to the challenges faced by the housing authority and the priorities it
established during its formative period between 2002 and 2005. The paper concludes
with an assessment of the impact of the relocation on the Mushuau Innu community
and the lessons learned from the experience. It acknowledges the benefits of the
relocation, but it also recognizes the challenges that the community still faces.
Relocations in Canada
Since the beginnings of permanent European settlement in “Canada” in the 17th
century, Aboriginal communities have experienced the negative effects of
displacement from their traditional dwelling, hunting and fishing grounds. This
displacement included restrictions on the use and changes in the territories of
Aboriginal homelands as a result of land-purchase agreements, treaty-making
processes and the establishment of reserves, beginning in the 18th century. Since
Confederation in 1867 and the passage of the Indian Act of 1876, the displacement of
Aboriginal people has often taken the form of deliberate initiatives by federal
governments to move particular Aboriginal communities for administrative or
development purposes.1 According to the Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) released in 1996, most of these relocations must be seen
as part of a broader process of dispossession and displacement, a process with
lingering effects on the cultural, spiritual, social, economic and political aspects of
people’s lives. The main problems identified by the commission included the
government’s overall attitude of paternalism and its arbitrary use of power. Decisions
were often made with little or no consultation and many of these “planned”
administrative and developmental relocations were undertaken on short notice
(RCAP, 1996, vol. II, chapter 11, p. 3).
It is important to acknowledge that the practice of relocation was common and that
relocations took place throughout Canada. Aboriginal communities from Tsulquate
and Burns Lake in British Columbia to Makkovik, Nutak, Hebron and Davis Inlet in
Labrador were affected by the process. For the Mushuau Innu, the move to Natuashish
was the third relocation that they had experienced in less than 60 years. The first took
place in 1948, a year before the Canadian government assumed fiduciary responsibility
for Aboriginal communities in Newfoundland and Labrador and a second relocation
took place in the late 1960s (RCAP, 1996, vol. II, chap. 11, pp. 5-7).
In discussing criteria and standards that should guide future relocations, the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples stressed the necessity of ensuring that: 1)
1 Although there have been many reasons for relocation, and these reasons cannot always be neatly
separated, the moves can be grouped into the two main categories: administrative relocation and
developmental relocation. Administrative relocations are moves carried out to facilitate the operation
of government or to address the perceived needs of Aboriginal people. Developmental relocations have
a long history and have been used frequently around the world as a rationale for population transfer.
Developmental relocations have often been related to agricultural expansion and land reclamation,
urban development and hydroelectric projects. See RCAP, 1996, vol. II, chap. 11, pp. 5-7.
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appropriate authority is obtained by government before proceeding with relocation; 2)
those to be relocated provide their informed consent to the relocation; 3) the relocation
is properly and carefully planned, carried out and supervised; 4) the promises made
are kept; and 5) the relocation is carried out with consideration for, and respect shown
to, those being moved (RCAP, 1996, vol. I, p. 117). These criteria represent an
important and historically situated reference for the assessment of contemporary
Aboriginal relocations and apply, in particular, in a case such as the third
administrative relocation of the Mushuau Innu in December 2002.
The Mushuau Innu of Labrador
For 6,000 years or more the Innu had been nomadic hunters, traversing the interior
region of the Labrador/Ungava Peninsula, which encompasses virtually all of
Labrador and a significant portion of northern and eastern Québec north of the St.
Lawrence River (Ryan, 1988, p. 4). The Mushuau Innu are part of the larger Innu
population that currently includes approximately 16,000 members living in 13
communities in Labrador and Québec (Samson, 2003, pp. 70-1). The Innu of
Labrador number about 1,600 and live primarily in two communities: Natuashish and
Sheshatshiu. They are represented politically by an organization called the Innu
Nation.
In the mid-1920s, during a cycle when the caribou were particularly sparse, the
Mushuau Innu began to spend their summers along the shores of Davis Inlet and
Voisey’s Bay (Henriksen, 1994, pp. 5-6), the former of which was also the site of the
Hudson’s Bay Company trading post. In 1948, Newfoundland authorities closed this
trading post at Davis Inlet and moved the Mushuau Innu to Nutak, about 400
kilometres north on the Labrador coast. This move was undertaken without
community consultation or consent. A year later, the Mushuau Innu, unhappy with the
new arrangement because it was so far away from traditional hunting grounds, walked
back to Davis Inlet. In 1967, at the urging of the local priest,2 several government
officials and Innu chief Joe Rich, 150 Innu were moved about four kilometers away
to a new Davis Inlet (Utshimasits), on Iluikoyak Island, where they lived on a year-
round basis (Backhouse and McRae, 2002 and Roche, 1992b).
After Newfoundland and Labrador joined Confederation in 1949, the federal
government began to build new houses for the Innu. The houses were small (750
square feet), built close together and had few amenities. While equipped with tubs,
toilets and sinks, the houses had no water or sewage services, few pieces of furniture
2 The Roman Catholic Church, along with provincial and federal governments, has played an important
role in shaping the lives of the Innu. By the late-19th century, Labrador Innu received sporadic summer
visits from Catholic missionaries – initially from the diocese of Québec and later from Harbour Grace
(Tanner, 1998, p. 242). Missionaries converted many Innu to Roman Catholicism and were among the
first to supply the colonial government with information about Aboriginal people in Labrador,
including the Innu. According to Colin Samson (2003, p. 29), 20th-century missionaries were
instrumental in encouraging Innu settlement in order to promote not only the “orderly establishment of
relations among the congregated Innu, but between them and the state and Church”. The first Innu
chief, Joe Rich, was appointed by Father Edward O’Brien in the 1920s and, according to Samson, the
chief “unwittingly became an instrument of the priest” (see also Henriksen, 1973, p. 97-8).
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and a single power outlet. Many families used hot plates or diesel fuel to start fires to
warm their homes (Innu Nation, 1995). Gradually, the residents of Davis Inlet found
themselves slipping out of touch with their traditional migratory way of life while
having difficulty fully embracing a “modern”, sedentary lifestyle.
The slow but steady disengagement of the Innu from their traditional hunting
grounds and migratory lifestyles accelerated in the 1960s with settlement in the new
Davis Inlet. According to the recollections of community member George Rich
(2000), some of the last long-distance trips by dog team to hunt caribou were made
by community families in the 1960s (see also Henriksen, 1973). The opening of a
school in the 1960s made it more difficult for children to learn the hunting way of life
and the Innu language. As “the church school, Social Service, clinic, store and
RCMP” began to change their lives, rates of substance abuse, alcoholism and family
violence increased (Innu Nation, 1995). Meanwhile, many changes were taking place
on and around traditional Innu hunting and burial grounds. In the 1970s, a
hydroelectric development at Churchill Falls flooded thousands of hectares of land. In
the 1980s and early 1990s, the Innu fought against the introduction of low-level
military flight training over caribou and waterfowl habitat. And in the same period
that the third relocation initiative was being conceived and realized, natural-resource
exploitation intensified following the discovery in 1994 of one of the richest nickel
deposits in the world at Voisey’s Bay.3 The rapid pace of development in the area
gave the Innu community little time to adapt to the new reality of corporations and
governments transforming the local landscape.
The 1949 Terms of Union and Jurisdictional Difficulties
In addition to being repeatedly relocated, the Mushuau Innu, along with the Inuit and
Mi’kmaq in Newfoundland and Labrador, experienced particular jurisdictional
difficulties (Hanrahan, 2003, p. 211). The 1949 Terms of Union under which
Newfoundland and Labrador entered Confederation made no reference to Aboriginal
peoples, although the matter had been discussed during the negotiations between the
representatives of Newfoundland and Canada (Backhouse and McRae, 2002; Samson,
2003, pp. 54-6; Roche, 1992a). A special bilateral committee on the future status of
Newfoundland’s Aboriginal peoples in Confederation concluded that the Mi’kmaq,
Innu and Inuit in the new province should be brought fully under federal jurisdiction,
but this failed to happen. Since the province had no reserves and its Native peoples
had recently exercised the right to vote, the introduction of the Indian Act would have
raised politically awkward questions. Instead, it was agreed that the province would
administer Native affairs with grants from Ottawa. As Adrian Tanner (1998, p. 238)
argues, Canada and Newfoundland missed an opportunity in 1949 to pioneer a better
Native policy. As a result, the Innu claim – with some justification – that for more
3 The Voisey’s Bay deposit is a vast sulphide ore body containing rich nickel, copper and cobalt
resources. A total investment of approximately $3 billion will be made in mining and processing in
Newfoundland and Labrador over the estimated 30-year life of the project. According the Voisey’s
Bay Nickel Company Limited, the project employed over 800 individuals in 2005
(http://www.vbnc.com). A number of Innu and Inuit from the surrounding communities are employed
by the company.
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than half a century the federal government refused to recognize its constitutional
obligations and that this has resulted in a continuing failure on the part of governments,
both provincial and federal, to provide them with the level and quality of services
received by other Aboriginal peoples in Canada. While First Nations status in
Newfoundland and Labrador is now being achieved slowly and in a piecemeal fashion,
the lack of action by the provincial and federal governments in terms of assuming their
constitutionally binding responsibility has had lasting negative repercussions on
Aboriginal well-being (Backhouse and McRae, 2002; Hanrahan, 2003).
Research Approach
As planning and construction work in the new community began, it became evident
that there was a need for focused support for Innu governance during the relocation.
Most importantly, the people of Natuashish needed good policies and processes in
place to manage their new housing stock. A portion of the relocation funding was
therefore allocated to the creation of a stakeholder support team to undertake various
community capacity-building activities. Established in 2001, the team included
representatives from federal and provincial governments, private sector groups,
academic institutions and various First Nations organizations.4 My membership on
this support team, as a representative of Mount Allison University’s Rural and Small
Town Programme, gave me direct contact with the Innu community and the
Natuashish Housing Authority staff and board members, and provided many
opportunities to visit Davis Inlet and Natuashish. Research-related interviews with
community members were conducted in conjunction with meetings held to help the
NHA to develop its housing policies and procedures documents. The interviews
themselves served, at that time, as a “stock taking” and reflection tool. They helped
NHA board members, NHA staff and government representatives to refine their
approach to reaching specific developmental goals and to articulate more effectively
ideas for dealing with logistical, social and political challenges. Carefully 
timed interviews were also designed to aid stakeholders in building
organizational/institutional memory. Interviews were scheduled to complement many
capacity-building tasks undertaken by the team members, including the development
and review of the housing authority’s documents as well as various meetings and
workshops. The interviews gave many Innu community members an opportunity to
discuss their immediate concerns and reflect on the broader political and cultural
contexts and the community’s history. My participant observation and journal-
keeping informed the work of the support team. A great deal was also learned from
the community through my being involved in practical work such as conducting
housing board and staff workshops, developing staff job descriptions and initiating a
resident life-skills counseling programme. The life-skills counseling programme, for
4 Representatives were from the following organizations: Innovative Business Alliance Corporation,
Sydney, Nova Scotia (NS); Turtle Island Associates, Ontario; Ki’Knu Housing, NS; Health and
Community Services Department, Miawpukek First Nation, Newfoundland and Labrador (NL);
Aboriginal Housing Inspectors from Paq’tnkek First Nation, NS and Indian Brook First Nation, NS;
Rural and Small Town Programme, Mount Allison University, New Brunswick; Labrador School
Board; Health Canada, Labrador Secretariat; and other provincial and federal agencies and
departments.
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instance, involved teaching Innu families safe use and basic maintenance of
appliances in their new homes. They learned about washing machines, dryers and
electric stoves and how to properly monitor air exchange systems and water heaters.
This approach to research on the relocation was important because the story of the
relocation had to be told in a way that was useful to those willing to learn from it.5
Several specific tools were used for data collection: participant observation;
involvement in consultations, meetings and group discussions; group and individual
key informant interviews (with community leaders, community members,
professionals involved in the relocation project and government representatives); and
analysis of a range of relevant documents such as internal correspondence, media
reports and research studies. Between September 2003 and September 2004, 18 in-
depth interviews were conducted with representatives of several key stakeholder
groups: the Natuashish community leadership and band council; the NHA staff; the
federal government and private sector organizations involved in implementing and
managing the relocation initiative; professionals engaged in the construction work; and
community service providers living in Natuashish. All interviews were anonymous.
Some names and events referenced in these interviews were omitted from this paper to
avoid exacerbating political and social tensions in an already charged environment.
Before the Move: Relocation Planning
Plans for the new community of Natuashish began to take shape in the early 1990s as
media reports detailed how unbearable life was in Davis Inlet. In 1994 the federal and
provincial governments made a formal commitment to support and fund relocation to
a mainland site of the community’s choice. From a distance, it appeared that the
suicide attempts in 1993 by several young people precipitated the Innu demand that
their community be relocated, but relocation had been actively pursued by the Davis
Inlet Innu for many years (Press, 1995). In March 1992, the Mushuau Innu had
5 The case study research approach and elements of the Standard Logic Model and Temporal Logic
Model of programme evaluation were used in documentation and analysis of the relocation (Gasper,
1997; den Hayer, 2002). The Standard Logic Model was invented in the 1960s by a team of
consultants led by Leon Rosenburg (Gasper, 1997). Over the last 40 years it has become part of
standard procedure for programme and project management and evaluation at various Canadian and
international agencies and organizations. Despite slight variations in terminology and structure, the
purpose of a logic model is to illustrate the programme’s/project’s components and how they logically
link together. A logic model is also used to measure the success of the programme/project against its
original plans (see den Hayer, 2002). Although current logic models can be continuously revised to
reflect new programme realities, they do not capture the fluid motion with which the
programme/project adapts to a chaotic environment, the contributing factors, nor the evolving
stakeholder learning. In order to address this issue, the International Development Research Centre’s
(IDRC) Evaluation Unit has researched and developed an alternative logic model that could include
programme/project responsiveness to environmental changes and the organizational learning process.
This alternative model, the Temporal Logic Model (TLM), achieves this goal through periodically
recording contextual changes, making an interim assessment and integrating any subsequent
modification (see den Hayer, 2002). The evaluation completed in relation to the Mushuau Innu
relocation helped to measure the initiative’s interim outcomes against its original plans. In addition to
measuring outputs against inputs in this complex undertaking, an evaluation of the learning process
was incorporated to allow for a better understanding of emerging interim strategic possibilities and
possible future directions for the NHA and other community stakeholders.
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organized a community consultation process called a “Peoples Inquiry” in which they
probed some of the causes of the social disintegration in the community. The Innu
created a seven-point plan for change, which, among other healing and renewal
measures, included the relocation. It was believed that such a move would help the
Innu regain “their spiritual power”, their “social and psychological health”, and their
“collective identity and self-esteem” (Henriksen, 1993). Key practical reasons
articulated in support of the relocation included: 1) the rapid expansion of the
Mushuau Innu population; 2) the lack of additional land for community expansion; 3)
the steadily deteriorating supply of safe drinking water; 4) the need to improve
radically the community’s infrastructure and living conditions; and 5) the poor access
to the mainland and the community’s traditional hunting grounds – Iluikoyak Island
was accessible only by air at least four months per year (Innu Nation, 1995).
In 1994 the Mushuau Innu Band Council (MIBC) and provincial and federal
governments reached an agreement to provide necessary funding for the relocation of
the community and signed a Statement of Political Commitments. Several socio-
economic and technical studies were undertaken following the signing of this
agreement (Whitford Environment Ltd. 1994; Arcéos Inc., 1996). According to the
findings in some of these studies, it was impossible to supply the Davis Inlet
community with adequate running water from wells on the island. Indeed, the
estimated cost of establishing a source of fresh water on the mainland and piping that
water to the community was higher than relocating Mushuau Innu to an entirely new
community (Wilkinson, 1995). In a 1995 study commissioned by Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada, Wilkinson and Masella evaluated several sites for the new Innu
village. Little Sango Pond (Natuashish) was chosen as the preferred location. The
Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement (MIRA) between the Mushuau Innu of Davis
Inlet and the Canadian government, finalized in 1996, outlined the parameters and
financial arrangements for the project, which included a requirement on the Innu side
to adopt a long-term comprehensive community plan that addressed social and high-
unemployment problems in the new community at Sango Bay. The Innu were to
ensure, through proper feasibility and technical studies, that the new town site was
technically and environmentally viable and that the cost of construction of the new
town and the relocation was “reasonable” and reflected the initial estimate of $82
million (INAC, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/info/info62_e.html).
On 29 October 1996, an overwhelming 97 per cent of Mushuau Innu voted to
approve the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement and directed the Mushuau Innu
Band Council to sign it. The MIRA was signed in Utshimassits on 13 November 1996
by Chief Katie (Kiti) Rich, Ron Irwin, minister responsible for the Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), and Newfoundland and
Labrador Premier Brian Tobin. As part of this agreement, regressive federal and
provincial programmes were “devolved” or gradually eliminated and new initiatives
were put in place to promote the renewal of Innu health, culture, society and economy.
The preamble to the agreement included a clause that confirmed the status of the
Mushuau Innu as “Indians within the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867” (quoted in Backhouse and McRae, 2002, p. 2).
The province agreed to provide the land for the new community through a 20-year
renewable lease, with the potential of a future transfer of land to the Innu resulting
from land claim negotiations. The Canadian government agreed to provide funding
Mushuau Innu Relocation from Davis Inlet to Natuashish 71
16981-05 Burns Article  9/21/06  7:11 AM  Page 71
for relocation planning, design and site construction at an estimated cost of $82
million. Federal authorities anticipated that this amount would cover the cost of wood-
frame houses, water and sewer systems and roads as well as a power station, a school,
a nursing station, an airport, a wharf, a post office, a band council office, and police
and fire facilities. This estimate also included moving expenses and the cost of
decommissioning of the Davis Inlet site (Backhouse and McRae, 2002).
In addition to the signing of the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement, several
important initiatives were undertaken in 1996 that had a significant influence on the
relocation process. These initiatives included the development of a community
relocation plan, the creation of a relocation negotiation team that included Mushuau
Innu and provincial and federal government representatives, and the establishment of
a smaller Mushuau Innu Relocation Committee that was to provide Innu input. Under
the terms of the MIRA, the goal was to involve Innu in the construction and provide
employment and training opportunities (Backhouse and McRae, 2002 p. 31).
Relocation Accomplished
Construction-related work on the new site started shortly after the signing of the
agreement. As the first trees were cut, land was prepared and geological and
archeological surveys were conducted on the new site. There was also significant time
and energy devoted to handling contracts, dealing with the media and preparing
briefings for high-ranking federal government officials. The actual community move
began six years later, in December 2002. The Innu were not all moved at the same
time since only 70 of the 133 planned homes were ready for occupancy that
December. According to the main contractor, Davis Engineering Inc., delays in
construction were due primarily to the short shipping season for building supplies and
furnishings. Despite the lack of housing the move went ahead as scheduled. The
relocation date had been set and the political pressure was heavy on those charged
with delivering the accommodations on time and as promised. During the official
move, a number of Innu families stayed behind in Davis Inlet. Others shared homes
on the new site with their fellow community members for several months. The
remaining 63 planned homes were completed by the end of 2003. The relocation
alleviated the chronic housing shortage for a while, but the rapidly growing Innu
population needed additional homes for its young families and accommodations for
teachers, nurses, the RCMP and other service providers. In 2003, the Mushuau Innu
and the federal government reached an agreement to construct 71 additional homes
for community members over the following two years.
Reactions to the New Homes
Despite the delays, the new, modern homes built in Natuashish represented a
considerable improvement over accommodations in Davis Inlet. Still, some
community members believe that the homes could have been better suited to their
needs. Although input relating to community-specific housing needs and preferences
had been gathered from the Innu, not all of this feedback was integrated into the
design of the actual town site.
Before the construction started, the Mushuau Innu had been presented with the
town layout, several home designs and colour choices. Many Innu liked what they
saw. According to two women interviewed in the community, the new homes seemed
Acadiensis72
16981-05 Burns Article  9/21/06  7:11 AM  Page 72
“nice”, “warm” and “well built” (Anonymous, 2003, February 23). Similar sentiments
were expressed in other interviews with community members conducted before and
after the relocation. The blue, gray and burgundy-coloured modern bungalows and split
entry homes could easily blend into many Canadian residential neighbourhoods. Others,
however, had a different opinion. Kajetan Rich, for instance, who persisted in
unofficially “redesigning” his own home to suit his family’s needs as it was being built
by the local construction crew, argued that Natuashish’s first homes were too
“conventional” and that future housing should better reflect the Innu lifestyle and
culture: “I tried to fight for some design changes for my own home with no success; then
I went to the site as my home was being built and asked construction workers to change
the location of walls, remove some partitions (with no real extra cost involved);
however, not everyone had an opportunity to do so; even things such as the orientation
of the house (facing East) is important to our culture, but it is not accounted for in the
current design criteria”. Rich explains that “some families bring their caribou from the
hunt right to the kitchen” and that “the engineers who designed these homes did not
consider that this is the way things are often done in this community”. The shortcomings
in home design included a lack of direct access from outside to a large utility area as
well as an overall shortage of supply and equipment storage space. Moreover, house
plans did not reflect the importance to Innu families of open, multi-purpose living
spaces. Some of these issues could have been resolved, Rich claims, by offering families
an on-site design consultation (Rich, 2004, February 24). Writing in 2000, George Rich
underscored the uniqueness of the Innu and the fact that “white” society often fails to
acknowledge cultural differences. He argues that the Innu know how to build and repair
expertly their traditional teepees made of caribou hides and that adopting “modern”
home maintenance standards is expected to take some time. The Mushuau Innu culture,
he notes, is rooted in a nomadic past that stretches back more than 6,000 years, and Innu
have lived in “conventional” houses for only 30 years (Rich, 2000, p 38).
While house-related damage was frequent in Davis Inlet, there has been
significantly less damage and vandalism to the new homes. To a stranger visiting
Natuashish in 2005, the homes may not look particularly appealing (most of the
basement level windows are boarded up to cover or replace broken windows or to
avoid breaks), but according to NHA staff and the majority of community residents
the homes are in good condition. Aside from some imperfections in appearance, most
residences are structurally sound, in good repair and regularly maintained.
Although the homes remain comfortable, the community still lacks indoor and
outdoor recreation facilities for both young and older Innu. Such facilities have not
been built in Natuashish partly because of disagreement between the Innu and the
federal government on funding obligations. In talking about her life in Natuashish,
one NHA employee noted that her own children “come back from school and stay
inside for the rest of the day” (Rich, 2004, April 15). While the conditions in Davis
Inlet were bad, she recalled that it at least had a recreation hall with a multi-purpose
room where all sorts of activities were held. Innu women, for instance, could go
dancing at the disco in the community while men stayed at home playing cards.
Establishment of the Natuashish Housing Authority
One of the most important institutions in the new community of Natuashish is the
Mushuau Innu Housing Authority (MIHA), which was created by the Mushuau Innu
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Band Council in 2000. In 2002 the MIHA was renamed the “Natuashish Housing
Authority” (NHA) and was granted authority by the Mushuau Innu First Nation
(MIFN), which had become, as part of reserve-creation process completed in 2003,
the official legal body representing Mushuau Innu. The NHA was to implement the
housing policy and to look after all aspects of community development related to
existing and future housing assets, and it is accountable to the chief and council. By
the time the community finished its relocation, most people knew about the NHA, its
mandate and the work it was doing in Natuashish.
The establishment of the NHA was one of the federal government’s conditions for
covering the full cost of the new houses in Natuashish. The NHA was to become the
organization which, under the guidance of the MIBC, would effectively and
sustainably manage the community’s residential assets. One of the vehicles for
moving towards maintaining long-term financial sustainability was the establishment
and reinforcement of the payment of rents and housing charges. NHA capacity-
building was considered a priority (largely by the federal government) as it would
enable this organization to garner sufficient revenues for the housing operating budget
and eventually reduce the community’s dependence on federal government financial
support. Sound housing management and administration practices were expected to
reduce housing maintenance and damage-related repair costs and, over time, to
promote community awareness of the upkeep costs associated with quality housing.
Furthermore, families would learn that paying for some of these services was their
own responsibility.
From its inception in 2001, the multi-stakeholder support team worked closely
with the housing authority’s board members and staff and Mushuau Innu First Nation
leaders to help them achieve their goals. The work started with implementing key
elements of the NHA Housing Strategy conceived in 2001 and refined during the
following year. These elements included: training of the housing authority board of
directors on their respective roles and responsibilities; training the housing authority
staff and developing their job descriptions; helping with the implementation of the
housing plan, including development of the housing policy and procedures; and
implementing a client-orientation (life-skills) programme designed to provide all
community residents with skills related to living in, and taking care of, the new
housing (INAC, 2002, January).
In the spring of 2003, Sidney Peters was hired as a NHA mentor. By this time the
relatively new NHA board and staff had made a transition from planning and
preparation to management of the housing in Natuashish. The mentor’s role was to
help those involved with the housing authority to cope with their various
responsibilities without feeling overwhelmed. An experienced Aboriginal housing
professional from mainland Nova Scotia, Peters became widely respected by
members of the local community. He helped to facilitate better communication
between team members from outside of the community and those from Natuashish.
Although based elsewhere, he agreed to stay in the community periodically and help
the NHA with its day-to-day work.
In 2005 the NHA organization had its foundations in place. These included a
functioning office with full- and part-time staff on duty as well as its own policy,
housing procedures and an electronic housing database. The NHA Housing Policy
succinctly outlines the general role, operating principles and structure of housing
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management in Natuashish. The Housing Procedures document, for its part, contains
explicit and detailed operating guidelines allowing the NHA board and staff to
undertake various housing management-related duties, including how to allocate new
housing, respond to complaints, hire staff and conduct timely housing inspections.
The NHA now administers home inspections, maintenance and repairs for all
Natuashish residences occupied by community members and service providers. It is
also actively involved in the housing planning process for the community and
continues to facilitate the life-skills, construction and housing maintenance
mentorship, and job-shadowing programmes. The latter allows NHA staff to
continuously work with experienced professionals in the areas of financial
management, housing repair and housing inspection. Despite these achievements,
some of the NHA’s capacity-building and overall performance-related initiatives have
not been successful and much of the work – including the long-term life-skills
programme implementation strategies and partnership-building skills development –
has not been fully realized.
NHA’s Challenges and Priorities
As with many organizations, one of the critical challenges for the NHA is the lack of
resources. Of necessity, the board, staff and mentor spend a considerable amount of
time tackling problems caused by the delays in housing construction and housing
shortages in the community. They are also engaged in a variety of processes designed
to move the housing portfolio forward. The NHA was actively involved in the reserve
creation talks and a new round of housing negotiations between the Innu and the
federal government, which began shortly after the last of the first 133 homes was
completed in 2002. While this work is an important part of the NHA’s mandate, it
meant that less time was available to build staff confidence and the organization’s
internal structure and rapport with the community and service providers.
The NHA also faces difficulties being recognized in its own right. Although
members of the Mushuau Innu Band Council agree that they need the NHA “to do its
job” and that having an arm’s-length relationship between the council and the NHA
is the best way to achieve that goal, community members do not always make such
fine distinctions. Many have trouble abandoning their expectation that everything,
including housing-related issues, can only be resolved by the chief and council.
Securing confident, well-trained and reliable NHA staff is essential to achieving
recognition and respect for the NHA in the community and beyond. While early staff
training efforts were successful and several original staff members remain employed
by the NHA, many have left the organization over the last four years. Between 2002
and 2005, for instance, the NHA trained and subsequently lost three housing
managers. Some staff members were not able to deal with political, personal and/or
other pressures and, after working for some time, resigned. Two band council
elections over the same period contributed to a major turnover of people in positions
of leadership. While no one argues against the idea that “patterns of White control
need to be broken” (Henriksen, 1994, p. 11), key informants in and outside the
community are convinced that an entirely Innu-staffed NHA cannot manage the
community’s present-day housing needs and programmes. Those more involved with
the NHA stress that, in this regard, patience is key in building staff skills and self-
reliance. In addition, a clearer structure and tighter organization of the main office
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functions must be put in place if employees are not to feel overwhelmed by daily
tasks.
Many informants suggested that the housing authority needs to continue building
its relationships with the community by proceeding with its work on the life-skills
programme. Stronger links between the NHA and social-programme delivery
organizations, and possibly other communities such as Miawpukek First Nation,
Newfoundland, could complement its efforts in internal staff capacity-building and
nurturing strong working relations with the Mushuau Innu Band Council.6 Although
the federal government is eager to withdraw direct logistical and financial support for
the NHA, building and maintaining an independent programme-delivery system will
take longer than originally estimated. The funding allocated for governance capacity-
building in the area of housing was tied to the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement
(MIRA) funding, which did not indicate that there would be ongoing support for the
NHA. It was hard for the Innu to foresee the need to pressure the government to
commit to longer-term funding for capacity-building and governance support as the
creation of the housing authority was new to the community. There will continue to
be a need for an interdisciplinary group of stakeholders to provide various forms of
assistance for the NHA’s operations: direct, face-to-face office and operational
support, even if it is done only periodically; regular support and training in preparing
funding and initiative proposals; advice on and facilitation of linkages with other
groups, organizations and communities (locally, provincially and nationally); and
support in gradually reducing the NHA’s dependency on federal government funding
and achieving real self-sufficiency. A number of federal government internal memos,
documents and confidential interviews with federal civil servants conducted during
my work in Natuashish revealed that there was an underlying objective in the
government’s agenda – to reduce the Mushuau Innu’s drain of the federal treasury –
and that this had been so since the beginning of relocation negotiations in 1993.
The Reality of Relocation
When turning back to the “big picture”, it is important to remember that the Mushuau
Innu relocation was one of the most ambitious and costly relocations of an Aboriginal
population in Canadian history. The sheer scale and complexity – and the social,
political and environmental conditions that made the move necessary – make it
difficult to evaluate the move as an ultimately positive or problematic undertaking.
The relocation presented different challenges and benefits to the community’s
members, to its leaders, to those charged with the construction and the move, and to
the Canadian public. While the passing of time will no doubt allow for a clearer
perspective on the value of the relocation, analysis of what now seem to be
contradictory outcomes can help inform current public policy decisions that will
affect the Innu, and likely other Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities, before
the relocation becomes “history”.
By the end of 2004, the federal and provincial governments had spent approximately
6 Representatives of Miawpukek First Nation have been successfully working with the NHA on various
capacity-building tasks including housing repairs and inspections as well as on the life-skills
programme.
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$280 million to move 700 Innu to Natuashish. According to a CBC Radio News report,
this is about $400,000 for every man, woman and child in the community (CBC Radio
News, 2005, February 8). Although it is important to acknowledge the cost of this
undertaking when assessing its effectiveness and overall value, it is crucial to fully
appreciate the Innu perspective: they demanded that the governments assist them in
overcoming years of life in a poor and crowded community by building in a new
location and that this new community should provide the Innu with the physical
amenities enjoyed by the overwhelming majority of Canada’s population. More
importantly, the relocation was to provide a fresh start for the community members
willing and eager to confront their long-time substance dependency, family violence and
other physical and psychological ills (Innu Nation, 1995). In the end, the criteria to
determine the value of this relocation are as varied as the organizations, government
bodies and individuals participating in this process. At the core of many discussions
about the effectiveness of the relocation, however, is the comparison of the monetary
investment against the socio-physical benefits the community gained by moving from
Davis Inlet to Natuashish.
For their part, most of the 700 Innu living in Natuashish seem to be pleased with
their new community and proud of it. Kajetan Rich, a long-time community leader
and chair of the Mushuau Innu Relocation Committee, pointed to a reason for this
satisfaction when he noted in a conversation that this relocation was different from the
one that preceded it in that the Innu were consulted. In the relocation from the old to
the new Davis Inlet in 1967, the Innu had little input in the process. From the earlier
experience, Rich argued, “we learned that we had to receive community input on the
relocation and we made a conscious decision to follow the community’s mandate
from day one of this initiative” (Rich, 2004).
The relocation project offered many training and employment opportunities for
community members. For example, the creation of the Camp and Catering Company,
which provided services to the construction crew building the community over a three-
year period, was an important initiative that allowed the Mushuau Innu to establish and
participate in a joint-business venture that employed many community members. Other
employment and training benefits were experienced in the construction trades and the life-
skills support and counseling areas. For example, two Innu construction crews were
involved in building family homes in Natuashish. At least a dozen Innu men and women
gained experience in various service-industry jobs such as cooking and facilities
maintenance while working in the construction camp set up to build Natuashish, and seven
Innu women and men were trained in various housing-maintenance tasks so that they
could help to train the remaining families relocating in the new community. After the
completion of the construction phase, most trained local community members did not
want to move away to work despite the limited opportunities locally. While some
individuals have lost their temporary employment since the effective conclusion of the
relocation, the initiative enhanced community members’ confidence and range of
professional skills. And the direct benefits of the relocation are obvious. Along with
moving into comfortable, “modern” homes, the Mushuau Innu were able to address many
serious problems that had plagued Davis Inlet. These included overcrowding, lack of land
for community expansion, poor access to the mainland and poor water quality (Innu
Nation, 1995).
Despite improving the community’s physical living conditions, many of the “old
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demons” accompanied the Innu to Shango Bay. One of the most serious of these
demons has been substance abuse. Innu Chief Simeon Tshakapesh revealed the
findings of one study he conducted in Davis Inlet in 2000 that showed that 154 of the
169 youths in the community had abused solvents at some point in their lives
(Diversity Watch, www.diversitywatch.ryerson.ca/backgrounds/innu.htm).
According to information provided by community members and service providers, the
rates of addiction among the adult population have been fluctuating at around 70 per
cent since the early 1990s (Innu Nation, 1995, p. 143). Kevin Head, a former
coordinator for the Labrador Innu Comprehensive Healing Strategy in Natuashish,
who left the community in November 2003, claims that 80 per cent of all community
members have a problem with alcohol (CBC Radio, 2003, December 15).
Difficulties with the education of Innu youth also continue. A recent federally
commissioned study indicates that one in three Innu children in Labrador never
attends school, and students suffer from a high level of developmental, learning and
physical challenges (Philpott et al., 2004). Between 1993 and 2004 only three students
of the hundreds of school-age children in the community completed high school and
there is little likelihood that many more will do so in the immediate future. Without a
high school education, young people in the community face a bleak prospect when it
comes to finding work either in their own community or elsewhere (CBC Radio,
2004, December 14).
According to the Innu themselves, serious problems also impede the provision of
social services. The staff is almost entirely from elsewhere and they do not always
work as effectively as they could (Innu Nation, 1995, p. 121). With a chronic shortage
of qualified staff and high turnover rates, service organizations have difficulty
maintaining meaningful continuity and building relationships of trust and
collaboration with the community at large. Natuashish’s remote location is very
important in this context. Many professionals are unwilling to relocate with their
families to a small community where their spouses do not have many employment
opportunities. Some still come, but they often do not manage to cope with the
magnitude of the social, health and other problems that their clients experience.
There are other challenges that, while not unique to Natuashish, also make
community life difficult. Entrenched family rivalries, nepotism and lack of
transparency and accountability influence many, if not most, community activities.
The problems stemming from family rivalries and nepotism represent not only the
community’s response to long-term economic and social deprivation, but have roots
in the Innu traditional social system based on family allegiances and solidarity – a
system that is challenged by the imposed system that has a single chief and council
overseeing a community composed of several family groupings. Many of those in the
community who “make it” in the political and/or economic sense are torn between
their loyalty to their own family members and their duty to serve the entire Innu
community. In many cases those elected to council are pressured to make decisions
that favour their own kin. A lack of transparency was often cited by community
members in cases of various employment appointments and allocations of travel and
other limited community funds. To make matters worse, the media spotlight has
affected many aspects of the community’s relations with the outside world and has
even led to exploitation by profit-seeking opportunists (i.e., consultants seeking
contracts). While the mandate from the community has long been for leaders to “work
Acadiensis78
16981-05 Burns Article  9/21/06  7:11 AM  Page 78
Mushuau Innu Relocation from Davis Inlet to Natuashish 79
together and support each other”, to be more proactive and not to sink into a perpetual
state of disengagement (Innu Nation, 1995, p. 125), it has often proven difficult to live
up to these ideals.
Lessons Learned
Some of the challenges faced by those involved in the relocation project were related
to time – both in terms of delays and in terms of haste. Most of the key informants
commented that the time to plan the relocation and the new community was not
sufficient. The federal government was embarrassed by the media coverage of the
deplorable living conditions and the social problems in Davis Inlet. This sense of
embarrassment, the public pressure and the desire for the problem to go away shaped
many key relocation decisions. The government’s mandate was to complete the whole
relocation project in three to four years, but its efforts were thwarted as delays
occurred at the beginning and during the progress of the initiative.
Among the reasons for the delays was a lack of transparency and efficiency in the
planning and delivery of the project. The process involved many different
stakeholders, including a number of levels of provincial and federal government
bureaucrats, many of whom were expected to defend and adhere to specific agendas
and mandates. For example, the federal civil servants directly involved in managing
the relocation were asked about, and encouraged to focus on, the physical and
financial aspects of the move rather than participating in the “big picture” discussions
– in large part due to the federal government’s strategy to mitigate potential liabilities
by concentrating only on contractually binding issues. While a small number of Innu
leaders were consulted regularly, some crucial planning and relocation decisions were
made by the senior steering committee comprised of high-ranking bureaucrats.
Ultimately, there was not enough productive communication between the various
levels of government.
Another problem was that between 1996 and 1999 the Mushuau Innu had been
responsible for receiving and managing a significant amount of federal government
transfer monies while having no clear financial management-control framework or a
clear agreement on deliverables. The responsibility and the information flow were
overwhelming. Moreover, there were also rumours concerning financial discrepancies
and mismanagement of the funds by the band council and, as these rumours became
more widely known, the situation was “remedied” by shifting the control of the
project into the hands of the federal government.7 One extreme was replaced with
another with the result that the collaborative relocation planning and implementation
framework was severely undermined. Moreover, complicated relations among the
initiative’s stakeholders often impaired collaborative decision-making. Several key
relocation stakeholders noted that many of those charged with the relocation did not
really “step up to the plate”. This made for a rough start and delayed significantly the
initiative’s implementation. The delays, according to a few interview respondents
7 As is often the case when it comes to governments and large amounts of money, parts of federal
funding earmarked for the construction of the new community and the development of specific training
programmes appear not to have been spent as intended. If there is truth to rumours among Innu in the
community and among contracted employees, community leaders/leadership were sometimes taking
extended trips and purchasing various personal items.
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representing the community and the government, hindered the introduction of
important, innovative project-management strategies and the pursuit of pro-active
rather than reactive steps. The tone and the actual decisions made during many
meetings about the relocation were also influenced by what the media had to report
on the initiative or the community at the given time as well as how senior federal civil
servants decided to react to this information and the resultant public reaction.
One of the lessons learned in this regard was that the federal government placed
too much responsibility related to the management of finances, public policies and
strategic planning in the hands of Innu. No preliminary analysis was done of the
community’s capacity to manage such an ambitious undertaking and, as a result, the
process was initiated without the necessary support and skills development and
without an appropriate community-consultation mechanism. The federal government
also did not devote sufficient staff to the project. Only three employees from the
regional Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) office in Amherst, Nova Scotia,
were responsible for the day-to-day work.
Another problem identified by government and community representatives and by
professionals involved in the relocation was a lack of comprehensiveness in the
overall approach and execution of the relocation. For example, as one of the civil
servants noted, in community consultations related to the relocation planning more
serious consideration should have been given in the early stages to all possible
alternatives to the relocation to Natuashish, such as moving closer to the town of
Happy Valley-Goose Bay or attempting to modernize the Davis Inlet location for a
fraction of the current cost (see Wilkinson, 1995, for alternative relocation options).
These alternatives may not have been chosen, but the advantages and drawbacks of
the remote location of Natuashish would have been discussed and considered more
thoroughly by more community members.
While there have been a number of Aboriginal community relocations nationally
and in Labrador itself, the Davis Inlet-to-Natuashish relocation was perceived and
addressed by the majority of the participants as a unique experience. It was unsettling
to those on the front lines of programme delivery to hear, over the course of several
years of close involvement with a broad range of relocation stakeholders, only a few
passing references to other, similar experiences and lessons learned from these
experiences. Not only the Mushuau Innu, but also many of the participants in this
massive project felt at times overwhelmed and frequently adopted reactive steps when
confronting project-related challenges. One of more dramatic examples of such
reactive behaviour was observed in early 2003 when the remaining Innu followed the
first wave of community members to Natuashish and ended up living in tents or in
extremely crowded conditions in the finished homes. In response, the Innu leaders and
the government stakeholders were forced, during the summer of 2003, to finish
existing basement spaces in already constructed homes. This project took significant
energy and funds that could have been devoted to the construction of new homes if
the political decision had been to postpone the move to a date later than December
2002. Fortunately, according to accounts by many Innu community members, chief
and council members as well as other stakeholders involved in the relocation, the
decision to establish the housing authority in the community – more of an afterthought
than an integral part of the vision – has proven to be a good decision.
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Conclusion
The Mushuau Innu relocation to Natuashish provided “an incredible opportunity”, but
it also posed an “enormous challenge”, according to legal scholars Constance
Backhouse and Donald McRae in their Report to the Canadian Human Rights
Commission on the Treatment of the Innu of Labrador by the Government of Canada.
“It could be an opportunity for the transformation of the community, or it could result
in the social dysfunction of Davis Inlet simply being moved to Natuashish” (2002, p.
11). As many Innu themselves recognize, the outcomes, at least in part, depended on,
and will continue to be determined by, the choices and actions of the community.
Designing and implementing a sound Mushuau Innu resettlement strategy proved
difficult for everyone involved. In the context of relocations imposed on Aboriginal
communities by the government, however, the Davis Inlet-to-Natuashish move
represents a radical departure from previous undertakings. Most notably, the
community made a conscious decision to improve its life by relocating as well as to
relocate to a place of their own choosing. Early steps by the Mushuau Innu were made
without coercion and were supported by a community and stakeholder consultation
process.
The relocation itself generated a significant number of jobs for the Innu. Many
were trained in construction trades; others were trained in administration. As the
relocation activities were completed, though, economic and employment
opportunities in Natuashish became similar to those that had existed in Davis Inlet.
Exposure to and participation in this large-scale undertaking, however, allowed
community members to gain knowledge of the ways that they could engage in
economic development and entrepreneurial activities, and the benefits of this
experience are recognized by the Innu and by those involved in various training and
capacity-building activities during and after the relocation. In Natuashish, many jobs
could be available to the Innu in the service sector if the necessary education levels
are achieved. The Innu could, for instance, work in medical and social services
positions and as teachers, electrical technicians and managers. However, these
positions require university- and college-level professional training, which still
remains unattainable for the majority of the community members.
Innu leaders and community members agree that at this stage of the community’s
life there is also a great need to concentrate on current social issues in order to protect
the community. In a 1994 paper reflecting on 27 years of research among the
Mushuau Innu, Georg Henriksen argued that “for the Innu to be able to release their
innovative potential and create a richer economic basis for their community, they
must go through a process of healing both as individuals and as a community” (1994,
p. 3). One way to address those current social issues and to promote community
healing would be to complement existing school facilities and family
accommodations with a viable communal infrastructure where there are opportunities
for public gatherings and pastimes for all ages. The existing preoccupation with
improving the physical living conditions for individual Mushuau Innu families is
understandable, but there remains a need for greater investment in continuing social
programmes in the community. On a practical level, the community’s geographical
location presents logistical and financial challenges such as more difficult access to
various types of expertise required to undertake major community projects, the high
costs of food and all other supplies, and the limited options for transportation in and
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out of the community. This isolation will continue to play a role in efforts to build
community capacity and provide quality services, and these efforts should take into
account the added costs of doing work in this remote Innu town as well as the fact that
what is possible to do in other communities closer to major urban centres may take
many times longer in Natuashish.
Considering all the factors that worked against the Natuashish Housing Authority’s
survival and the building of its capacity, the initiative had a successful start. The move
to the new location is effectively complete, but much work lies ahead. The success of
community support and development initiatives – many of which relate to housing
and the NHA’s work – will depend largely on a well-planned, executed and sustained
post-relocation strategy. To draw on experience gained, efforts should be made to
engage the main stakeholders involved in various phases of the relocation process.
Moreover, the Innu themselves argue that the federal government should not abandon
the community when the last of the homes built under the relocation agreement is
completed, and that sustained support to the community is needed, both in order to
protect this significant financial investment and, more importantly, in order to
promote the well-being of the Mushuau Innu. Many Innu and members of the
capacity-building team fear that political pressure to curb spending will prompt the
federal government to pull out of the community without an exit strategy.
When looking five to ten years “down the road”, residents of Natuashish know that
they must develop – with all community members’ input – their own by-laws and
constitution that properly reflect their community’s priorities and needs. They need to
invest in Innu education and health services and to become more independent in
running their own programmes such as the Natuashish Housing Authority. They also
need to raise a generation of local community members capable of carrying out the
various jobs that are currently filled by outsiders. These goals have to be achieved if
the Mushuau Innu are to move gradually toward self-sufficiency and a self-governing
life in this new community.
A few community members, including Mary Jane Piwas, are not optimistic about
the future: “There is still a small shred of hope for Natuashish, but the way things are
going, with all our problems and blame being shifted to other people, to white people,
the RCMP and the government, then it all becomes hopeless” (Hutchinson, 2003,
November 4). But others are more optimistic. Kiti Rich, a former Innu chief,
maintains “we will not be able to go back to our traditions 100 per cent. We will be
using some Innu ways and some non-Innu ways of living. There will be two paths for
us. For example, there will be people in the country and others who will have careers.
We want our kids to grow up to be nurses, teachers or doctors, but to understand the
culture at the same time” (Innu Nation, 1995, p. 181). For his part, George Rich wants
to see his children prepared to face challenges in their lives and feel less “caught
between worlds” (2000, p. 38). Shaping a stable cultural identity remains a project in
progress in the newly completed Natuashish.
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